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IDENTIFICATION AND THE LIQUIDITY EFFECT OF
A MONETARY POLICY SHOCK
ABSTRACT
Conventionalwisdom holds that unanticipated expansionary
monetary policy shocks cause transient but persistent decreases
in real and nominal interest rates. However a number of
econometric studies argue that the evidence favors the opposite
view, namely that these shocks actually raise, rather than lower,
short term interest rates. We show that this conclusion is not
robust to the measure of monetary aggregate used or to the
assumptions made to identify monetary policy disturbances. For
example, when our analysis is done using non borrowed reserves,
we find strong evidence in favor of the conventional view.
Existing challenges to the conventional view lack credibility not
just because of their fragility. They are based upon measures of
policy disturbances which generate seemingly implausible
implications about things other than interest rates.
Lawrence J. Christiano Martin Eichenbaum
Federal Reserve Bank Department of Economics
of Minneapolis Northwestern University
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Minneapolis, MN 55480 and Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago
and NBER1. Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shocks
cause transient but persistent decreases in real and nominal interest rates. However, there
is virtually no formal econometric evidence in the literature to support this contention.
(See Reichenstein 1987 for a review of the literature.) Indeed, many empirical studies have
concluded that the data support the opposite view, namely, that unexpected shocks to
monetary policy actually raise, rather than lower, short—term interest rates. (See for
example Mishkin 1981, 1982 and R. King 1991.) This finding typically is rationalized as
reflecting the weakness of liquidity effects associated with expansionary monetary policy
and the relative strength of expected inflation effects on nominal interest rates. (See, for
example, Mishkin 1981, 1982 or S. King 1983.) We argue here that an analysis of the data
which pays particular attention to the problem of measuring monetary policy shocks
reveals substantial support for the conventional wisdom. Existing results in the literature
which purport to cast doubt on that wisdom are not robust to plausible changes in
identifying assumptions or to alternative ways of measuring money.
Analysts of monetary policy must confront two problems. One is just which
measure of money to use. After all, we have at our disposal a plethora of measures ranging
from narrow, direct measures of open market operations like nonborrowed reserves (NBR)
to relatively broad aggregates like M2. The choice of money measure has important
implications for inference because different monetary aggregates interact in very different
ways with short—term interest rates. The other problem is which set of identifying
assumptions to adopt to measure the exogenous component (if any) of changes in monetary
policy. Without such assumptions, causal inference is simply not possible. In practice, these
two choices —ofmonetary aggregate and identifying assumptions —cannotbe viewed as
distinct problems because there is no reason to believe that any given set of identifying
assumptions will be equally appropriate across different measures of money.These difficulties notwithstanding, empirical work on the liquidity effects of
monetary policy almost always uses high—order monetary aggregates like Ml.t This choice
of monetary aggregate is usually coupled with the identifying assumption that the
monetary policy disturbance corresponds to the statistical innovation in money. Put
differently, innovations to objects like Ml are entirely attributed to the actions of the
monetary authority.2 In our view, an alternative assumption is at least as plausible,
namely, that innovations to NBR capture Fed policy shocks, while innovations to broader
aggregates confound many other shocks, in addition to policy shocks.3
In contrast to the existing literature, in this paper we use various measures of
money and different identifying assumptions to measure unanticipated shocks to monetary
policy.4 For each measure of money considered (NER, the monetary base, MO, and Ml),
we engage in a specification search across the elements of two classes of identifying
assumptions. The first class, which we call M—rzdes, is defined by the assumption that
unanticipated changes in monetary policy can be measured by some orthogonalized
component of the innovation to the monetary aggregate. Each such component corresponds
to a different assumption regarding the variables included in the contemporaneous portion
of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee's (FOMC's) reaction function for setting
tFor example, Mishkin (1981, 1982) Cochrane (1989), and R. King (1991) use Ml while Melvin (1983) uses M2,
and Reichenstein (1987) uses both Ml and M2. Indeed, Reichenstein's (1987) review of this literature does not
contain even one reference to a study whkh uses NOR or even MO as the measure of money. Recently, Cordon
and Leeper (1991) use MO in their analysis while Terhan (1991) uses weekly data on NBR.
2This assumptioo is implicit in studies that regress the interest rate on the unanticipated change in money,
where the latter is the residual from an equation in which the time t value of a monetary aggregate is regressed
against time t—1 variables. Such a procedure is asymptotically equivalent to running a vector autoregression
which contains, among other things, money and interest rates, and then calculating the moving average
representation implied by the assumption that the time t disturbance to money is orthogonal to innovations in
the other variables in the system. In Sims' (1986) terminology, this identification scheme amounts to adopting a
Wold causal chain in which money is placed first in the ordering.
3NBR is total reserves, less total borrowings of depository institutions from the Federal Reserve. (See Table
1.20, on page A12 of U.S., Federal Reserve Board l991a.) NBR is the monetary aggregate most closely
cuntrollable by the FOMC. Broader aggregates like Ml and M2 are less closely controllable, because the
non—NOR component in these aggregates is observed with a lag.
4Sima (1986) looks at different identifying assumptions conditional on using a particular monetary aggregate,
Ml, in his analysis.
2the monetary aggregate. While quite natural, this class of identifying assumptions is by no
means uncontroversial. McCallum (1983), Sims (1986, 1991), and Bernanke and Blinder
(1990) have argued that —atleast for high—order aggregates like Ml and M2 —
unanticipatedshocks to monetary policy are best measured as the innovation in the federal
funds rate. For this reason, we consider a second class of identifying restrictions which is
defined by the assumption that unanticipated changes in monetary policy can be measured
by some orthogonalized component of the innovation to the federal funds rate. Each such
component corresponds to a different assumption about the variables included in the
contemporaneous portion of the FOMC's rule for setting the federal funds rate. We refer
to this class of policy rules as R—rales.5
Our empirical analysis reveals that inference about the effects of monetary policy on
interest rates hinges critically on both the identifying assumptions exploited and the
measure of money used. Certainly we have found combinations of monetary aggregate and
identification schemes which together generate challenges to the conventional view. But in
every such instance the associated measure of unanticipated shocks to monetary policy
generates seemingly implausible implications about things other than interest rates. When
these combinations of monetary aggregates and identification schemes are eliminated, the
remaining combinations all yield results which strongly support the conventional view.
Specifically, using exactly identified vector autoregressions, we find that when identifying
assumptions corresponding to M—rules are coupled with either MO or Ml, unanticipated
changes in monetary policy generate increases in the federal funds rate. However, so
identified, unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shocks generate sharp, persistent
declines in aggregate output. Indeed, our point estimates indicate that, for Ml, real gross
5Asimple way to understand the difference between M— and R— rulesisto consider the extreme case in which
each failsto feed backon the contemporaneous value of any other variable. This version of the M—rule
corresponds toa perfectlyinterest—inelastic short—run money supply rule, while this version of the R—rule
corresponds toaperfectly elastic short—run money supply rule in which all shocks to money demand are
completely accommodated.
3national product (GNP) falls for over nine years. One cannot accept the interest rate
implications of these measures of monetary policy shocks without also accepting these
seemingly implausible aggregate output implications.6
Inference with MO and Ml is greatly affected by moving to the class of identifying
restrictions corresponding to ft—rules. Under these circumstances, we find that
unanticipated changes in monetary policy generate sharp, persistent declines in the federal
funds rate. Moreover, when measured in this way, unanticipated expansionary monetary
policy generates persistent increases in aggregate real output. We infer that if one insists on
using high—order monetary aggregates to study the effects of monetary policy on interest
rates, this class of identifying restrictions is preferable to the class of M—rules.
Interestingly, in sharp contrast to results based on MO or Ml, inference about the
effects of monetary policy on interest rates is very robust when the aggregate NBR is used
in the analysis. Regardless of whether we work with M— or ft—rules, regardless of whether
we work with monthly or quarterly data, and regardless of which postwar sample period we
work with, the same result emerges. Unanticipated expansionary policy shocks drive down
short—term interest rates for substantial periods of time. Measured in this way,
expansionary monetary policy shocks also generate increases in real GNP. It is hard to
imagine reconciling these findings with models that are empirically plausible and yet do not
incorporate quantitatively important liquidity effects.7 Building on earlier contributions by
Grossman and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), recent work by Lucas (1990), Fuerst
(1990), Baxter, Fischer, ft. King and Rouwenhorst (1990), Christiano (1991), and
tThere do exist economicmodels that canrationalize a fall in output following a money shock. (See Cooley and
Hansen ssg, Chnistiano 1991 and Christiano and Lichenhaum 1991.) However, we suspect that plausibly
pararneterired versions of these models will have difficulty accounting for the magnitude and persistence of the
fall in output.
7For example, one could construct a model in which the fundamental shocks driving the business cycle are
non—monetary and have the effect that, in equilibrium, there is a positive association between output growth
and the interest rate. If such a model incorporated a monetary policy of "leaning against the wind" —
tighteningmoney in a boom and easing in a recession —thenit would imply a negative association between
money and interest rates, even if the model had no liquidity effect. However, such a model would have the
coonterfactual impllcation that output growth and the interest rate are positively correlated.
4Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991) has stressed the importance of liquidity effects for
explaining the comovements between interest rates and monetary aggregates. We view our
results as being very supportive of that work.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present some basic facts about the
dynamic (unconditional) correlations between different monetary aggregates and the
federal funds rate. Three key facts emerge there. First, the federal funds rate displays a
sharp, robust, negative correlation with NBR. This negative correlation is masked by
moving to higher—order monetary aggregates. Second, once we control for the behavior of
borrowed reserves (BR), MO behaves much like NBR. Third, the federal funds rate displays
sharp, persistent, negative comovements with real GNP. The dynamic correlations between
these two time series are estimated very precisely and are very robust to sample period
selection. While highly suggestive, the results cannot be taken as evidence of any specific
causal mechanism. In particular, they cannot be used to formally infer that unanticipated
expansionary monetary policy disturbances cause interest rates to fall and aggregate real
output to rise. Such conclusions necessarily rely on theoretical restrictions which enable the
analyst to identify the exogenous component of monetary policy disturbances. This issue is
addressed in section 3, where we abandon the sharp distinction between theory and
measurement and use vector autoregressions to interpret the relationship between money
and interest rates. Finally, in section 4 we summarize our findings.
2. Some Basic Facts: The Dynamic Correlations Between Money, the Federal Funds
Rate, and Real Output
In this section we report some basic facts about the dynamic correlations between
different measures of money, the nominal federal funds rate and aggregate output. Our
primary findings are that the nominal federal funds rate displays strong negative
co—movements with different measures of the growth rate of money and of aggregate real
5output. The relationship between the federal funds rate and aggregate real output, as
summarized by their dynamic correlations, is estimated very precisely and is very robust
across different sampling periods as well as different stationary—inducing transformations of
the data. The negative relationship between the federal funds rate and the growth rate of
money is most pronounced and most stable when NBR is used as the measure of money.
In presenting these findings, we are mindful of the obvious caveat that correlations
do not imply causality. Still, the results in this section serve at least three useful functions.
First, these correlations represent important moments of the data that any business cycle
model ought to be consistent with. Second, the correlations suggest that monetary business
cycle models that display significant, persistent liquidity effects will be useful for
interpreting the data. Finally, they provide a useful background for the vector
autoregression analysis of section 3.
2.1Choosing Measures of Short Term Interest Rates and Money
Figure 1 displays the nominal federal funds rate (FF), the six—month nominal
commercial paper rate, and the three—month nominal Treasury bill rate over the sample
period from the first quarter of 1959 to the first quarter of 1990 (1959:1 —1990:1).Notice
that these different short term interest rates exhibit similar trends and move together quite
closely. In what follows, we display results based on FF for two reasons. First, consistent
with Figure 1, our results are not very sensitive to which interest rate we work with.
Second, numerous authors have stressed the important role that the federal funds rate
plays in monetary policy. (See for example Bernanke 1990, Bernanke and Blinder 1990 and
Kuttner and Friedman 1990.) Working with the federal funds rate facilitates comparisons
with this literature.
Choosing which measure of money to work with is a much more difficult task.
Existing monetary theories of the business cycle are simply too abstract to warrant
6focusing on any one measure of money. Adding to the difficulty is that different
components of any given measure of money often behave in very different ways. Consider,
for example, high—powered money, MO, which is the sum of currency in the hands of the
public, plus NBR, plus BR. As we shall show, the federal funds rate is negatively correlated
with NBR but positively correlated with BR.
In part, the different behavior of NBR and BR simply reflects the institutional
reality of how BR is determined. Of particular note is that discount window borrowing is
administered under a set of guidelines that is independent of the deliberations of the
FOMC. (See Goodfnend and Whelpley 1986 or Stigum 1990)8 In contrast, the FOMC
directly controls, by open market operations, the level of NBR. From this perspective,
NBR seems like a natural measure of money to use in identifying and estimating the effects
of shocks to monetary policy. At the same time, we recognize that NBR is not necessarily
the best measure of money for assessing the overall empirical plausibility of monetary
business cycle models. Consequently, we also present results using MO and Ml. Finally,
because of the importance of BR for some of the moments which we discuss, we also
display results using BR, MO less BR, and Ml less BR.
Figures 2a and 2b display seasonally adjusted average quarterly NBR (adjusted to
include extended credit) and FF over the sample period 1959:1 to 1990:1. As can be seen,
both exhibit a strong positive trend. Other measures of the money supply, such as the level
of MO and Ml, also display pronounced trends over this sample period Consequently, some
stationary—inducing transformation of the data must be adopted in order to calculate
meaningful statistics. In this section, we work primarily with the filter developed by
Hodnck and Prescott (1980). However, we also present results with linearly detrended data
8The basis for lending at the discount window is laid out in the Fed's Regulation A, according to which "Federal
reserve credit is available on a short—term basis to a depository institution under such rules as may be
prescribed to assist the institution, to the extent appropriate, in meeting temporary requirements for funds, or
to cushion more persistent outflows of funds pending an orderly adjustment of the institution's assets and
liabilities." (U.S., Federal Reserve Board 1991, sec. 201.3, par. (a)).and growth rates. The dark lines in Figures 2a and 2b display the Hodrick—Prescott (HP)
trend component of NBR and FF, respectively. In Figure 3a we display the HP—filtered
versions of NBR and FF. Note the pronounced negative association between these
variables. This basic fact is reflected in all of the formal statistics presented in this section.
Figure 3b presents the HP filtered versions of FF and real GNP. FF is positively
correlated with the contemporaneous level of GNP but negatively correlated with future
levels of GNP.
2.2A Benchmark Scenario
Before discussing our empirical results, we digress to consider the question: What
pattern of dynamic correlations would we expect to find in the presence of liquidity effects?
A precise answer to this question obviously requires a formal model.9 Still it seems
worthwhile appealing to existing models in the literature to provide some perspective on
our reduced—form results. In so doing we assume, as is the case for our measures of money,
that money, Mt, is positively correlated over time. Also, for simplicity, we consider a
benchmark scenario in which the only shocks are to the money supply.
Consider first the correlation between FFt and future values of Mt. Suppose that, at
time t, there was an unanticipated increase in the money supply. Civen a liquidity effect,
this would be associated with a decline in FFt. With Mt positively correlated over time,
high values of Mt would be associated with high values of Mt+ for r>0. Other things
equal, then, we would expect FFt to be negatively correlated with future values of Mt,
with the exact magnitude of the correlation depending on the sire of the liquidity effect and
the degree of serial correlation in Mt.
Next consider the correlation between FFt and past values of Mt. Suppose that at
Itecent examplesof such models areprovided by Baxter, Fischer, King and Rouwenhorst (1990); Lucas
(1990); Fuerst (1990); Christiano (1991); and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991).
8time t—i-, for r>0, there was an unanticipated increase in the money supply. This would
exert negative pressure on FFt_. Suppose that Mt is sufficiently autocorrelated that the
initial increase in Mt_i is associated with higher growth rates in Mt_+ for j)1. This,
we expect, would generate an increases in the anticipated rate of inflation from time t—r+j,
for j1. If the liquidity effect lasted only one period, then the inflation effect would
dominate after one period, so that FFt_+1, for j1, would rise. Consequently,
for j>I, would be positively correlated with Mt_i, that is, p(FFt, Mt_v) > 0 for r￿1,
where p(.,.) denotes the correlation operator. In fact, there is no reason to believe that the
liquidity effect lasts for only one period. Suppose instead that it dominated the expected
inflation effect for k periods. Then P(FFt, Mtr) would be negative for r￿k, but positive
for r>k. In this sense, k can be thought as measuring the persistence of the liquidity
effect.
While useful for pedagogical purposes, the logic of the previous scenario holds only if
the sole source of aggregate uncertainty is shocks to the money supply. With other shocks
to the system, the dynamic correlation between FF and the stock of money depends, at
least in part, on the way the FOMC reacts to the other shocks. For example, shocks that
stimulate money demand tend to create a positive association between money and interest
rates in an environment where the Fed seeks to smooth nominal interest rates. Still, were
the pattern of correlations arising from our benchmark scenario completely absent from the
data, we would have no obvious reason to seek evidence for liquidity effects in the context
of more complicated, multiple—shock representations of the data. In fact, the actual pattern
of correlations is consistent with ur benchmark scenario. This provides additional
motivation for the analysis of section 3, where we abandon the one—shock premise of the
benchmark scenario and analyze the data using exactly identified vector autoregressive
representations of the data.
2.3The Dynamic Correlations Between The Nominal Federal Funds Rate and Money
9Figure 4 presents, graphically, our point estimates of P(FF, Mt_i) for r= —8,...,8,
corresponding to three stationary—inducing transformations of the data: HP—filtered (the
first column), linear detrending (the second column), and growth rates (the third column).
The three rows contain results pertaining to NBR, MO, and Ml as the measure of money.
All correlations are based on variables which have been logged prior to the
stationary—inducing transformation. Figure 5 presents the analog results for BR, MO less
BR, and Ml less BR. The solid lines in Figures 4—5denotepoint estimates of the
correlations in question, along with a two—standard--deviation band, given by the dashed
lines. (Standard errors were computed using a generalized method of moments procedure.)
We begin by discussing results obtained with HP—filtered versions of the data.
Consider first the estimated values for p(FFt, M) for r= —8,...,8,when NBR is used as
the measure of money. Three findings here are notable. First, there is a strong, statistically
significant, negative contemporaneous correlation (equal to —0.39) between FFt and Mt.
This is consistent with the impression conveyed by Figure 3. Second, FF is negatively
correlated with leads and lags of Mt up to one year. Third, FFt is positively correlated
with Mt7. for r>4. These three findings are consistent with the benchmark scenario in
which a liquidity effect of a monetary policy shock dominates the anticipated inflation
effect for a period as long as a year.'°
The point estimates obtained with the broader measures of money display a
somewhat different pattern. As with NBR, our point estimate of p(FFt,Mt) is negative
when Ml is used as the measure of money (—0.02). However, unlike with NBR, the
maximal negative corTelation occurs at r= —3rather than r =0(p(FFt, Mt+3) =—0.33).
With Ml, as with NBR, FFt is negatively correlated with current and future values of
money. But unlike the results obtained with NBR, with Ml, FFt is positively correlated
with all past values of money. Interpreted from the perspective of the benchmark scenario,
10j0order to checktherobustness of these results, we redid our calculations using the nominal three—month
Treasury bill as our measure of the interest rate. This change has virtually no impact on our conclusions.
10these results are consistent with the existence of a strong liquidity effect, but one which is
less persistent than the effect observed with NBR.
The only measure of money with which FFt displays a positive contemporaneous
correlation is MO (p(FFt,M) =0.25).Even here, though, FFt is negatively correlated
with MOt+T, for r 1. As it turns out, the negative contemporaneous correlation between
MO and FF is attributable entirely to the BR component of MO. As Figure 5 reveals,
HP—filtered BR displays a very strong positive contemporaneous correlation with HP
filtered FFt. Presumably this reflects the incentive of banks to increase BR in response to
an increase in FF and the practice of accommodating transient increases in bank demand
for reserves through discount window lending.(See Thomas 1982, Goodfriend 1983,
Goodfnend and Whelpley 1986, and Stigum 1990.) Notice that when BR is subtracted from
MO, the resulting dynamic correlations are very similar to those between FF and NBR. As
might be expected, subtracting BR from Ml strengthens the negative correlation between
FFt and current and future values of Mt but dampens the positive correlation between FFt
and past values of Mt.
Consider next the results of working with growth rates of the data. Three features of
these results are worth noting. For every measure of money, there is a strong negative
correlation between FF and hit, regardless of whether or not we control for BR. In
addition, the growth rate of FFt is negatively correlated with future values of the growth
rates in NBR, MO, and Ml. Finally, FFt is positively correlated with past values of growth
rates in MO and Ml. This tendency is less pronounced with NBR.
Consider next our results with linearly detrended data. A number of comments are
in order here. First, with this stationary—inducing transformation, FF is negatively
correlated with current levels of the money supply and all its leads and lags (r =
—8.0+8) regardless of whether NBR, or MO, or Ml is used. Second, with MO and Ml,
the shape of the correlation functions using HP—filtered data and linearly detrended data
are quite different. In our view, this reflects the dubious validity of the assumption that MO
11and Ml are well represented as trend stationary processes with a constant trend over the
sample period as a whole. (See Stock and Watson 1989b, who argue that, over this period,
the money growth rate has an upward trend.)
In order to assess the sensitivity of our results to sample period selectinn, we redid
our analysis allowing fnr a break in the data at 1979:3. Figures 6, 7, and 8 present our
results for NBR, MO, and Ml, respectively, for the sampling intervals 1959:1—1990:1,
1959:1—1979:3, and 1979:4—1990:1. From Figure 6 we see that, despite some differences, the
results obtained with NBR are very stable across sample periods. However, Figure 7 reveals
considerable sample period sensitivity with MO. As a rule, the post—1979 and full sample
correlation functions are similar, at least when we work with HP—filtered data or growth
rates. However, the pre— and post—1979 periods results are quite different —sodifferent, in
fact, that inference regarding the plausibility of the benchmark scenario is substantially
influenced by sample period selection. For the post—1979 period, the dynamic correlations
appear to be entirely consistent with that scenario. For example, working with HP filtered
data, we find that p(FF,M0)<0for r< 1.In contrast, the pre—1979 results seem
difficult to reconcile with the benchmark scenario. Finally, Figure 8 reveals that sample
period sensitivity with Ml is intermediate to the two polar cases of NBR and MO.
We summarize our findings for the correlations between money and interest rates as
follows. First, when NBR is used, our results are consistent with what is to be expected
from the benchmark scenario. This is true regardless of which stationary—inducing
transformation or sample period is used. Second, the results with MO and Ml seem to
depend more sensitively on the sample period used. For the post—1979 period the dynamic
correlations of these aggregates seem to accord well with the benchmark scenario. Third,
we find that the time series properties of BR and NBR are very different. Simply adding
the two when working with monetary aggregates like MO obscures fundamental differences
in the ways that these two types of reserves interact with interest rates.
We conclude this section by briefly discussing the dynamic correlations between FF
12and per capita real GNP (Y). These are summarized in Figure 9, which displays our point
estimates of the correlations for three stationary—inducing transformations of the data and
three sample periods. Notice that, while the contemporaneous correlation between FFt and
is positive, FFt displays a strong, sharp, negative correlation with future values of
This is true independent of which stationary—inducing transformation is used or which
sample period is investigated. Interestingly, the correlation function of FF and seems
to be estimated much more precisely than the correlation functions between money and
interest rates. These results are consistent with findings by Kuttner and Friedman (1990),
Bernanke (1990), Bernanke and Blinder (1990), and Stock and Watson (1989b). They
show that the nominal federal funds rate is an excellent statistical predictor of real GNP,
with positive movements in FF preceding declines in real GNP.
3. VectorAutoregressions and the Liquidity Effect
We have documented the existence of a strong negative correlation between
different measures of the growth rates of the money supply and GNP with the federal funds
rate. However, while highly suggestive, these correlations cannot, in and of themselves, be
taken as evidence that unanticipated expansionary monetary policy disturbances drive
interest rates down and aggregate output up. At a minimum, providing such evidence
requires identifying assumptions that are sufficiently strong to isolate a measure of
monetary policy disturbances. As it turns out, inference regarding the effects of monetary
policy on interest rates hinges critically on two things: the identifying assumptions used to
obtain measures of unanticipated shocks to monetary policy and the measure of money
used in the analysis. As we shall show later in this section, these two things are intimately
connected. This ,connection is hardly surprising since the plausibility of any given set of
identifying assumptions clearly depends on the measure of money used in the statistical
analysis.
13To clarify the nature of the identifying assumptions which have been used in the
literature, suppose that the economy evolves according to
(1) AZt =B(L)Zt+
Heredenotes the time t values of the variables summarizing the state of the economic
system. For now we suppose thatcan be partitioned as=[ZiZ2t]', where
denotes the time t values of the observable, endogenous nonpolicy variables in the system
anddenotes the time t values of the policy instruments.
The fundamental sources of uncertainty in this economy are summarized by the
i.i.d. random variable p, which has the property that
(2) Eptp' =I,
where I denotes the identity matrix. The vector p is partitioned as t =[p11p]' where
it denotes the impulses to Z, for i =1,2. With this notation, p,2 represents the
fundamental disturbances to policy. The constant matrix A summarizes the manner in
which the contemporaneous values ofare related to each other, while B(L) is a matrix
polynomial in positive powers of the lag operator L. Notice that, absent restrictions on A or
B(L), specification (1) embodies the notion that the reaction function of the policy maker,
that is, the law of motion for Z2, depends on the current and past values of ali the
endogenous nonpolicy variables, Z1.
Now suppose we are interested in examining the historical effects of policy
disturbances; that is, we want to characterize the dynamic effects of past variations in
arising from different values of 2t on Given values for A and B(L), these responses




Under our assumptions, the (k,j) element of C5 gives the response of the kth element of
Z5 to a unit disturbance in the jth element ofst.
In practice, the problem with this procedure is that we cannot directly observe or
estimate the vector of policy disturbances, The vector autoregressive representation of
Z implied by (1) is given by






Absent additional restrictions on the system, all that the econometrician can hope
to estimate is the parameters of 11(L) and D, while the parameters A and B(L) of the
moving average representation (3) are not identified. One can calculate the moving average




However, absent very special assumptions regarding the matrix A, the statistical
innovations to Z, namely, the v1's, will not be the same as the fundamental disturbances
to agents' environments as represented by the ,i's. It follows that the dynamic response of
nonpolicy variables into shocks inwill not coincide with the the dynamic response of
those variables to shocks in vt. 11
Inorder to resolve this problem, sufficiently strong restrictions must be imposed to
identify the matrix A. While a variety of procedures have been adopted by empirical
analysts, the type of restrictions most relevant for the existing liquidity literature is
restrictions on the contemporaneous nature of feedback between the elements of Z, that is,
restrictions on the matrix A. To this end, most researchers in the area have proceeded by
adopting a particular Wold causal interpretation of the data. 12Thegeneral idea here is to
assume that the matrix A is triangular when the variablesare ordered according to their
causal priority. Under this assumption, there is a unique A which satisfies (8) for a given
ttFor a further discussion of the problems of ideotifying a moving average representation like (3), see
Hansen and Sargent (1991).
t2Some important exceptioos are Gali (1s91), King and Watson (1991), and Sims (19861991) who impe
exclusion restrictions on the contemporaneous component of determinants of money supply and demand to
identify monetary policy shocks. The first two of these also impose restrictions on the long—run relationships
between the variables in their vector autoregressions. Although we do not consider the kind of identification
schemes considered by these authors, they reach the same conclusion we do: that the balance of the evidence
favors the conventional view that short—term interest rates fall in response to an unanticipated monetary
tightening.
16covaiiance matrix D. In the context of the liquidity literature, these typesofidentification
schemes amount to a joint hypothesis about the nature of the contemporaneous portion of
the monetary authority's feedback rule for its policy instruments and the sources of
disturbances to the elements of Z. The set of M— and R—rules which we consider in this
paper fall within this class of identification schemes.
As an example, consider the sources of identification implicit in the work of Gordon
and Leeper (1991), who analyze aggregate time series data on the growth rate of the
monetary base, MO; interest rates, R; consumer prices,and industrial production,
that is, Z =[M0t,Rt, Inlooking for evidence of liquidity effects, Gordon
and Leeper base the bulk of their inference on the moving average representation of
corresponding to a lower triangular specification of the matrix A. In so doing, they identify
a standardized version of the statistical innovation of MO (that is, the first element in vt)
with monetary policy disturbances (that is, the first element in ,z.) As a result, they
assume monetary policy is an element of the class of M—rules, which we discussed in the
introduction. The economic content of placing MO first in the Wold causal chain is
twofold: innovations to the monetary base are attributed solely to the actions of the
FOMC, and in setting the growth rate of money, the FOMC does not consider the current
period values of interest rates, real output, or the price level.'3 While somewhat
controversial when stated in this manner, this is perfectly consistent with the long tradition
of identifying the innovation in some monetary aggregate with shocks to monetary policy.
(See, for example, Mishkin 1982, Barro 1981 and R. King 1991)14
In sharp contrast, Bernanke and Blinder (1990) and Sims (1986, 1991) adopt a very
different set of identifying restrictions which associates innovations to the federal funds
i3Placing R second in theWoldcausal chain amounts to the assumption that time t movements in interest rate
are independent of contemporaneous movements in both output and prices. Placing Y third in the Wold casual
chain amounts to the assumption that time t movements in output are independent of contemporaneous
movements in the price level.
'4A. Gordon and Leeper (1991) point out, there are important differences in this literature regarding which
variables are allowed to enter the law of motion for the monetary aggregate.
17rate with unanticipated changes in monetary policy. (They analyze elements in the class of
It—rules, which we referred to in the introduction.) Working with high—order monetary
aggregates, these authors adopt Wold casual interpretations of the data in which some
measure of short—term nominal interest rates is placed first in the ordering. 15 The economic
content of this assumption is also twofold: innovations to the federal funds rate reflect
solely the decisions of the FOMC, and the contemporaneous component of the FOMC's
feedback rule for setting Rt does not include objects like output, inflation, or the stock of
money.
In what follows we present evidence on the liquidity effects of unanticipated changes
in monetary policy using different identification schemes in conjunction with different
measures of the monetary aggregate. Here, as in section 2, the three monetary aggregates
considered are NBR, MO, and Ml. All of the vector autoregressions we estimated included
a measure of money, the federal funds rate, a measure of aggregate real output (Y), and the
price level as measured by the GNP deflator. t Quarterly vector autoregressions including
either NBR or MO included five lags of all variables, while those including Ml included
nine lags of all variables.'7
We begin by reporting results obtained using quarterly data over the period
1959:1—1990:1. The solid lines in Figure 10 present the dynamic response of the federal
funds rate to a shock in monetary policy, under five different identification schemes. The
dashed lines denote two standard deviation bands about point estimates of the dynamic
response functions.'6 All of the identification schemes share the assumption that the
t5Sims(1986,1991) works exclusivelywith Mlwhile Bernanke and Blinder (1990) experiment with both Ml aod
M2.
t5We found that our results were not affected when we used either the consumer price index or the constant
weighted GNP deflator instead of the GNPdeflatoras our measure of the price level.
t7Lag lengths were selected based on evidence regarding the serial correlation in the error term in the vector
autoregression, as measured using the Q statistic discussed in Doan (1990).
t5These were computed using the method described in Doan (1990), example 10.1, using 100 draws from the
estimated asymptotic distribution of the vector autoregressive coefficients.
18unanticipated change in monetary policy is some orthogonalized component of the
innovation to the monetary aggregate included in the vector autoregression. The three
columns contain results pertaining to the case in which the measure of money is NBR, MO,
and Ml.
Each of the five rows displays the dynamic response of the federal funds rate to an
unanticipated change in monetary policy generated under a different identification scheme,
each of which is summarized by the label "RESP of FF to M/X", M ={NBR,MO, Ml)
and X ={O,R, Y, P, (P,Y)}. The Wold ordering underlying the first row corresponds to
{M, R, Y, P}. Placing M first in the ordering equates, after scaling by their standard
deviation, innovations in M to unanticipated changes in monetary policy. This corresponds
to the assumption that the contemporaneous portion of the monetary authority's feedback
rule for setting Mt does not involve Rt,orThe Wold ordering underlying the second
row corresponds to {R, M, Y, P}, so that the unanticipated change in monetary policy is
measured as that portion of the innovation in Mt which is orthogonal to the innovation in
R. This corresponds to the assumption that the contemporaneous portion of the monetary
authority's feedback rule involves Rt, but not P orThe Wold ordering underlying the
third row is given by {Y, M, R, P}, so that the unanticipated change in monetary policy is
measured as that portion of the innovation in Mt which is orthogonal to the innovation in
that is, the contemporaneous portion of the monetary authority's feedback rule for Mt
involves Y, but not Rt orThe \Vold ordering underlying the fourth row is given by
{P, M, R, Y}, so that the unanticipated change in monetary policy is measured as that
portion of the innovation in Mt which is orthogonal to the innovation in Pt' that is, the
contemporaneous portion of the monetary authority's feedback rule for Mt involvesbut
not Rt or ''Finally,the Wold ordering underlying the fifth row is {P, Y, M, R}, so that
the unanticipated change in monetary policy is measured as that portion of the innovation
in Mt which is orthogonal to innovations in Pt andthat is, in setting Mt the monetary
authority looks atand Y, but not Rt. In no case do we impose any restrictions on the
19lagged components of the vector autoregression (VAR).
Consider first our results with NBR. Notice that, regardless of which identification
scheme is imposed, innovations to monetary policy are always followed by sharp,
persistent, statistically significant declines in Rt. In all but one case, the dynamic response
is the same: the immediate impact of the shock to monetary policy is to drive down Rt,
which stays below its preshock level for approximately 16 quarters. In the one exception,
the second row, labeled "RESP of FF to NBR/R," the identification scheme rules out, a
priori, a contemporaneous response of Rt. Even here, though, Rt falls in the period after
the shock and stays below its preshock level for approximately 20 quarters.
The second and third columns of Figure 10 reveal that changing the measure of
money from NBR to either MO or Ml has a drastic impact on inference. Measured this
way, innovations to monetary policy are followed by increases in Rt. In the case of MO, the
basic patterns are very similar across the different identification schemes: the immediate
impact of the shock is to drive up Rt, which stays above its preshock level for
approximately eight quarters, but then falls and stabilizes at a level slightly below its
preshock level.'9 Notice, though, that the standard errors associated with these impulse
response functions are quite large. Indeed, one cannot reject, at reasonable confidence
levels, the null hypotheses that the federal funds rate rises, falls, or is unchanged following
a shock in MO. Evidently, this monetary aggregate contains very little information for the
federal funds rate. When Ml is used as the measure of money, the positive response of Rt
to a policy shock is statistically more significant than is the case for MO.
In order to assess the sensitivity of results to the use of quarterly data, we redid our
analysis using monthly data. These results are presented in Figure 11. Since real GNP data
are unavailable at the monthly level, we used industrial production as our measure of
aggregate output and the consumer price index as our measure of the aggregate price level.
t5The identification scheme labeled "kElP of FF to Mo/k" precludes an immediate reaction of Rt to a
shock in monetary policy.
20As can be seen, these changes have very little impact on our results. Orthogonalized shocks
to NBR continue to drive the federal funds rate down, MO continues to contain very little
information for the federal funds rate, and orthogonalized shocks to Ml drive the federal
funds rate up.
To address the issue of sample period sensitivity we also redid our analysis using
two distinct sample periods. Figures 12 and 13 report results for NBR using quarterly and
monthly data, respectively. Figures 14 and 15 report the analogous results for MO while
Figures 16 and 17 display the analogous results for Ml. The three columns of each figure
display the response of Rt to unanticipated shocks to monetary policy, for the periods
1959:1—1990:1, 1959:1—1978:4, and 1979:1—1990:1, respectively. The class of identification
schemes considered is the same as that underlying Figures 10 and 11.
Consider first our results for NBR. Figures 12 and 13 reveal that there is some
sample period sensitivity. For both the monthly and quarterly data, the pre—1979 and
post—1979 results appear quite different from the full sample results. Still, for the monthly
data, it remains true that Rt always drops following an expansionary monetary
disturbance. This is true regardless of which identification scheme or which sample period
is adopted. At the same time, the persistence of the drop in the federal funds rate seems
much shorter in the post—1979 period. Figures 14 and 15 reveal that the response functions
generated using MO seem to be relatively stable across sample periods. Figures 16 and 17
reveal that the results obtained using Ml are the most sensitive to splitting the sample.
Here, as with NBR, the pre-1979 period looks similar to the entire sample period, while
the post—1979 period looks quite different.
To summarize this portion of our analysis, we find that when NBR is used as the
measure of money, there is very strong evidence that, relative to the identification schemes
considered, unanticipated expansionary changes in monetary policy drive the federal funds
rate down. It is hard to imagine reconciling this finding with models that do not
incorporate liquidity effects. In sharp contrast, when either MO or Ml is used as the
21measure of money, unanticipated expansionary changes in monetary policy drive the
federal funds rate up. Evidently, a given class of identification schemes generates very
different results for different measures of money. This result is hardly surprising. As we
stressed in the introduction, there is no reason to believe that a given set of identifying
assumptions will he equally appropriate across high— and low—order measures of the
monetary aggregate. Aggregates like NBR, MO, and Ml are influenced by very different
sets of economics agents.
Given these apparently conflicting results, how can we realistically hope to proceed?
One response is to investigate whether certain combinations of identification assumptions
and monetary aggregates can be eliminated on the basis of their implications for variables
other than interest rates. This seems to be the case for the class of identification schemes
which equate unanticipated changes in monetary policy with some fraction of the
innovations in MO or Ml. For example, Figure 18 displays the dynamic response function
of GNP to shocks in monetary policy for the M—rule class of identification schemes
underlying Figures 10 and 11. Notice that when Ml is used in the analysis, shocks to
monetary policy are followed by sharp persistent declines in GNP which last over nine
years. While less pronounced with MO, the salient effect of such shocks is also a large
persistent decline in GNP. Even taking sampling uncertainty into account these declines
last for roughly three years, with the exact horizon depending on the identification scheme
used. In sharp contrast, when NBR is used in the analysis, these types of shocks generate
increases in aggregate output.2' We conclude that, if one conditions on the class of
M—rules considered here, then the results based on NBR are the most plausible. Those
results provide strong support for the importance of the liquidity effect.
A different class of identifying restrictions not captured in Figures 10—17 emerges
20This effect emerges most clearly under the assumption that the monetary authority sets MO taking into account
the contemporaneous values of the price level and/or GNP.
2tThere is some sEnsitivity to when the rise in GNP hegios.
22from the analyses of McCallum (1983), Bernanke and Blinder (1990),andSims (1986,
1991). These authors argue that, at least relative to high—order monetary aggregates like
Ml or M2, the innovation in Rt is a better measure of unanticipated changes in monetary
policy than the innovation to the stock of money. In pursuing this idea, Bernanke and
Blinder (1990) and Sims (1986, 1991) assume that innovations inarise solely from the
actions of the monetary authority and that the contemporaneous portion of the feedback
rule for setting Rt does not include Mt, ''orP. In short, they place Rt first in their
Wold causal chain. More generally, their arguments suggest measuring monetary policy as
some orthogonalized component of the innovation in the federal funds rate.
Figure 19 reports a subset of the implications of this class of identifying restrictions.
In particular, each row displays the response function of Rt to a shock in monetary policy
measured using a different identification scheme. The graphs labeled "RESP of M to
FF/X," M ={NBR,MO, M1} and X ={O,R, Y, P, (P,Y)} denote the response of the
monetary aggregate to a contractionary monetary policy disturbance, where the latter is
identified as that component of the innovation in Rt which is orthogonal to X. The Wold
ordering underlying the first row is {R, M, Y, P}. This corresponds to the identification
scheme imposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1990) as well as Sims (1986, 1991). The Wold
ordering underlying the second row is {M, R, Y, P}, so that the unanticipated change in
monetary policy is measured as that portion of the innovation in Rt which is orthogonal to
the innovation in Mt. This corresponds to the assumption that the contemporaneous
portion of the monetary authority's feedback rule for setting Rt involves Mt, but notor
Yt. The Wold ordering underlying the third row is {Y, R, M, P, so that the unanticipated
change in monetary policy is measured as that portion of the innovation in Rt which is
orthogonal to the innovation in Y. This corresponds to the assumption that the only
contemporaneous variable which the FOMC looks at when setting Rt is Y. The Wold
ordering underlying the fourth row is {P, R, M, Y), so that the unanticipated change in
monetary policy is measured as that portion of the innovation in Rt which is orthogonal to
23the innovation inThis corresponds to the assumption that the only contemporaneous
variable which the FOMC looks at when setting Rt is 't Finally the Wold ordering
underlying the entries of the fifth row is {P, Y, R, M}, so that the unanticipated change in
monetary policy is measured as that portion of the innovation in Rt which is orthogonal to
the innovations in bothandThis corresponds to the assumption that in setting R,
the FOMC looks atandbut not Mt.
Figure 19 reveals that, with one important exception, unanticipated changes in
monetary policy, corresponding to an increase in Rt, are foUowed by long declines in the
stock of money, regardless of whether the latter is measured as NBR, MO or Ml. The only
exception to this pattern arises with NBR under the identification scheme generating the
graph labeled "RESP of NBR to FF/NBR." Here NBR rises for approximately 15 quarters
before falling below its pre shock level. One possible interpretation of this uses the fact that
the monetary shock here is that component of the innovation towhich is orthogonal to
NBR, that is, it is the movement in Rt which cannot be predicted on the basis of the
current level of NBR. Viewed from this perspective, the increase in NBR after such a shock
may be the consequence of a policy in which the monetary authority smoothsfluctuations
in the federal funds rate arising from what it perceives to be shocks to the demand for
money. Goodfriend (1991) and others argue forcefully that this has been an important
feature of postwar fcderal feserve policy. Finally, Figure 20 presents the analog to Figure 19
obtained with monthiy data. As can be seen, our results are quite insensitive to this
perturbation.Thus, abstracting from one identification scheme, conditioning on the
H—rules leads to the inference that there is an important liquidity effect.
4. Summary
We conclude this paper by summarizing our two main findings.
24First, we found that when nonborrowed reserves are used as the measure of money,
inference regarding the effects of unanticipated changes in monetary policy on interest rates
is very robust. When the shock to monetary policy is measured as some orthogonalized
component of the innovation to nonborrowed reserves, the federal funds rate displays a
sharp, large, persistent decline in response to expansionary monetary policy. When the
shock to monetary policy is measured as some orthogonalized component of the innovation
to the federal funds rate, unanticipated contractionary monetary policy, corresponding to
an increase in the federal funds rate, is accompanied by a sharp, large persistent decline in
NBR.
To us, these findings constitute strong evidence in favor of the view that
unanticipated expansionary open market operations drive interest rates down, at least in
the short run, that is, the federal reserve lowers interest rates by withdrawing nonborrowed
reserves from the system. It seems unlikely that these findings can be reconciled with
models that do not incorporate liquidity effects.
Second, we found that when either MO or Mi is used as the measure of money,
inference regarding the effects of unanticipated changes in monetary policy on interest rates
is very sensitive to the identification scheme adopted. When the shock to monetary policy
is measured as some orUiogonalized component of the innovation to the federal funds rate,
unanticipated contractionary monetary policy, corresponding to an increase in the federal
funds rate, is accompanied by a sharp, large, -persistent decline in MO and Ml. Thus, this
class of monetary rules generates evidence in support of liquidity effects. In contrast, when
the shock to monetary policy is measured as some orthogonalized component of the
innovation to MO or Ml, the federal funds rate displays a large, persistent rise in response
to expansionary monetary policy. However, these shocks generate implications for real
output which seem to us implausible. We conclude that the balance of the evidence,
including the dynamic correlations discussed in section 2, is consistent with the
conventional view of the effects of monetary policy disturbances on interest rates.
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